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MODERN MACROECONOMIC THEORY: AN OVERVIEW
Jean-Paul Fitoussi
"If I say that the world around us shows all the 
signs of being chaotic, this is not as despairing 
a conclusion as it might seem, since it is possi­
ble for a system to be chaotic at one level and 
regular at another: thus we may have to abandon 
hope of making detailed predictions of the motion 
of microscopic elements in a fluid, yet still find 
we can make reliable predictions ot its motion on 
a coarser scale".
Sir Brian Pippard (1980)
"Explanation of macroeconomic phenomena will be 
complete only when such explanations are consist­
ent with microeconomic choice Theoretic Behavior 
and can be phrased in the language of general equi­
librium theory".
Drazen (1980)
General equilibrium theory and Keynesian economics have 
always maintained an ambiguous relationship founded on a superiority 
complex about theory on the part of the one and a conviction of 
greater empirical relevance on the part of the other.^ But the 
seventies have shaken this latter conviction by verifying Friedman's 
(1968) and Phelps' (1970) famous prediction that any rate of in­
flation is compatible with a given unemployment rate. This has 
given rise to hopes of the end of the keynesian reign and strengthened 
the general equilibrium theorists in their assurance of superiority.
1) An ironic illustration of such a view will be found for example 




























































































Also, the reassertion of the crisis of (keynesian) macroeconomics 
is paralleled by new research whose scope and diversity gives the 
impression of great richness.
Two axioms constitute this theoretical revival and, even when 
rejected en bloc (e.g. Davidson 1977), they are only exceptionally 
discussed per se:
Axiom 1: "The existence of a metalanguage": macroeconomic relations
must have microeconomic foundations. This proposition establishes 
from the outset the subordination of the macro to the micro approach, 
and, at the same time, it ranks economic arguments in implicitly 
acknowledging that microeconomics is itself well founded. Yet it 
is not clear that macroeconomic relations can be derived in this 
fashion. If one considers a sufficiently large number of agents 
the structural properties of the excess demand functions, apart 
from budgetary identity and continuity, vanish (Sonnensheim, 1973; 
Debreu, 1974). This implies that the qualitative properties of 
macroeconomic relations remain indeterminate. The practical sig­
nificance of this result is that macroeconomic theory should set 
itself up as an autonomous discipline and seek also other foundations.
Axiom 2: "The existence of a metatheory": there exists a class
of models which yield macroeconomic propositions while rendering 
explicit their microeconomic foundations; namely general equilibrium 
theory which by virtue of this axiom is given the status of a meta­
theory, a common structure within which all other theories must be 
expressed. In this framework the "no-bridge" problem is spurious 
for it is theoretically possible to represent a system at as de­
tailed a level as one wants. The level of aggregation chosen 
depends on the problem one is given to analyze. In this sense 
general equilibrium theory is not to be identified with a particular 
model - that of Arrow-Debreu - but should be considered as a method 
which allows the choice of the states of a model where individual 
decisions are mutually consistent. "The type of consistency that 
is assumed to exist between individual decisions is specific to 
each equilibrium theory" (Malinvaud, 1977, p. 7) which explains the 




























































































General equilibrium, thus freed of its normative connotations, 
constitutes the common base of all theoretical developments. Since 
keynesian macroeconomics has a traditional leaning towards explain­
ing the short term, the reference model will be that of temporary 
equilibrium theory. In this framework the typical economic agent 
resolves an optimisation problem which differs according to alterna­
tive theories by the nature and number of constraints taken into 
consideration rather than by the theoretical justifications of the 
constraint. In all models expectations are generated by functions 
whose specifications can be different; in particular, expectations 
can be rational. This latter assumption, when considered within 
the theoretical framework of temporary competitive equilibrium, 
produces radical implications for economic policy.
The existence of a common frame of reference, then, does not 
lead to the allaying of doctrinal quarrels. It is of little use 
to say that there are wide (theoretical) divergences on the very 
possibility of economic policy. In spite of the uniqueness of the 
scientific research programme, paradigms concerning the mode of 
cooperation between public and private agents remain radically 
divergent.
The new theoretical developments, their theoretical structure 
and the language in which they are expressed imply, therefore, 
that rational behaviour is the absolute criterion for the evaluation 
of macroeconomic propositions. Thus the major questions which 
modern macroeconomic theory seeks to answer can be formulated in 
the following way:
Can rational behaviour be reconciled with the existence of 
voluntary unemployment?
Can rational behaviour be reconciled with the existence of 
macroeconomic fluctuations?
The nature of these questions puts the debate back onto the 




























































































marks the end of an illusion: that there is a consensus over the
representative model of the economy, produced by the similarity 
between Friedman's theoretical framework (1970) and the neokeynesian 
analytical framework.
The first part of this essay will be a broad outline of the 
evolution which has led to questions of this type. Then in the 
second part the attempt, in recent literature, to answer these 
questions will be discussed.
1 PROLEGOMENA: FROM EQUILIBRIUM TO DISEQUILIBRIUM OR THE LOGIC
OF A COUNTER-REVOLUTION.
The existence of an underemployment equilibrium represents a 
major challenge to what Keynes called the classical theory.
Either Keynes took as a starting point a model different from that 
then prevailing or he was simply discovering states of that model 
which had so far not been studied. A reading of the General Theory 
gives support to both of these interpretations thus guaranteeing 
the continuation of controversies on the nature of the keynesian 
revolution.
However, it is clearly the second interpretation which was 
immediately favoured since it made it possible to express two doctrinally 
opposed positions in the terms of a common language (Hicks, 1937).
Here the keynesian message appeared as specific to a situation, 
as dependent on restrictions imposed upon a more general proposition; 
price rigidity, monetary illusion, liquidity trap, the non-inter- 
section of functions on a positive plane etc.... In short, a 
whole series of factors implying either the introduction of arbitrary 
(free) parameters^ or an ad hoc specification of the functions
1) Modigliani, for instance, seems to, support such an interpretation: 
"The ability of the model set out in the General Theory to 
explain the persistence of unemployment could be traced pri­
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The way is thus open for the reintegration of the keynesian 
message into a more general system of interpretation: the neo­
classical synthesis. First Pigou, then Patinkin, have shown that 
the reference to an underemployment equilibrium was an abuse of 
language since the real balance effect would ensure that even a 
proportional prices and wages fall would lead to the re-establish­
ment of full employment. Even if this is an extremely painful way 
back to equilibrium and even admitting its slowness, its very exist­
ence is sufficient to qualify the keynesian situation as "under-
2 )employment disequilibrium". Also the differences between neo­
classical theory and keynesian economics, which previously had 
been strongly underlined, are not really structural differences, 
but sui generis: "It now becomes possible, a quarter of a century 
having passed, to consider the General Theory as an important 
episode in the continuous development of the general neoclassical 
system" (Kuenne, 1963, p. 347). The merit of John Maynard Keynes 
has been to draw attention to the length and weakness of the 
adjustment processes generated by disequilibrium in contemporary 
economies; "but in the field of static general equilibrium theory 
where the existence of countervailing forces, though weak, is 
sufficient to produce full employment., its performance has been 
essentially deficient" (Kuenne, 1963, p. 361).
1) cf. L. Klein (1966).
2) For a complete discussion of the real balance effect see 
Tobin (1980, Ch. 1). But Tobin himself, and in spite of the 
lack of empirical relevance which he assigns to the real balance 
effect - by virtue of a probable asymmetry between the propensi­
ties to spend of debtors and creditors - seems to fall in with 




























































































This reinterpretation does not seem to call into question anything 
substantial. The persistence of disequilibria leaves economic policy 
with its raison d'etre. The spontaneous tendency towards equilibrium 
can be speeded up by appropriate budgetary and monetary policies, 
which will also allow the avoidance of the various vicissitudes 
associated with deflation (bankruptcies, entrapment of debtors, the 
self fulfilment of pessimistic expectations, etc....). Therefore 
nothing essential is called into question if a dynamic adjustment 
relation expressing the rate of change of prices as a function of 
disequilibria is added to a keynesian type model. The model 
becomes sufficiently eclectic as to be able to produce both keynesian 
and monetarist results, monetarist in the long period and keynesian 
in the short period.
The Phillips curve should then be considered as the missing 
equation of a macrosystem, more than as a theory of inflation. Its 
introduction allows the solution of the problem of dividing changes 
of nominal income into price and quantity changes. But if an 
adjustment relation determining the rate of inflation as a function 
of the deviation of the actual employment rate from its natural 
level - or between the production level and its full employment 
level-is added to an IS-LM model, the model then undergoes a 
structural mutation. Full employment becomes the stable equilibrium 
position (assuming that the equilibrium position is unique ) and 
the structure of the model is altogether similar to that of a 
standard neoclassical model (Lipsey, 1978). The different points 
on the Phillips curve must also be considered as distinct moments 
in the same adjustment process. But "the adjustment process itself 
has not in general been successfully described as optimizing be­
haviour, the only paradigm that carries theoretical conviction in 
our profession. This failure neither surprising nor discreditable 
in view of the intrinsic difficulties of the task is the root of the 
chronic crisis in macroeconomics" (Tobin, 1981, pp. 36-37).
How should the Phillips relation be interpreted? As a rule 




























































































of the process in real time? The study of the stability of a static 
model gives to it no definite dynamic properties. It is then argued 
that only by taking into consideration economic agents' expectations 
can this task be accomplished. And there is no longer anything 
keynesian in a short period neoclassical model which explicitly 
considers expectations (Lucas, 1981). We are back at our starting 
point: either the existence of an underemployment equilibrium,
consistent with individual rationality, can be established, or the 
keynesian message will be lost in ad hoc specifications, not only 
because of the intrinsic difficulty of building a dynamic model, 
but because the persistence of disequilibria in a walrasian model 
contradicts the most elementary rationality axioms. By accepting 
the theoretical supremacy of the competitive equilibrium model 
and its immediate import - that keynesian theory is the eco­
nomics of underemployment disequilibrium “ keynesians have thrown 
out the baby with the bathwater. This is the theoretical measure 
of the macroeconomic crisis, if it is identified with the neoclassical 
synthesis.
This would not be the case if it were possible to prove that 
price adjustment ceases before fully accomplishing its function of 
eliminating disequilibria: such a possibility can be discussed
in at least three non mutually exclusive ways. Individual rationality 
would come up against the higher order rationality of the system 
which would limit the possible range of price variations. The 
system must have the ability to ensure its perpetuity, the permanence 
of its institutions, which would be eroded by an excessive price 
flexibility : the legal nature of the labour contract which gives a
time dimension to the wage labour relations, the establishment 
of contracts in monetary terms, the protection of the production 
apparatus which is sometimes linked to that of debtors, etc.
It is not surprising that these considerations are to be found in 
different forms in the "general theory". The theory of a monetary 
economy of production could not neglect the institutional structure 
of our society. Moreover an embryonic economic theory ■ of social 
conventions exists (Ackerloff, 1979; 1980), but has not yet generated 
much interest, though there are some exceptions (Solow, 1979, 1980). 
This way of apprehending the problem gives some credibility to the 





























































































But the function of price adjustment can also be seen as a rule 
applied by individual agents - and not by the auctioneer - in an 
attempt to relax the quantity constraints which prevent the realiza­
tion of their plan. Since these individual agents do not enjoy 
the auctioneer's ubiquity, it is perfectly possible that they will 
stop adjusting Jjefore a walrasian equilibrium is established, not 
perceiving any incentive to go further. They also exhaust the 
exchange opportunities, perceived or conjectured, for lack of 
knowledge of real opportunities. But this implies that at the 
point of underemployment equilibrium reached the economy is not 
perfectly competitive (in the walrasian sense of the term) and 
its structure can be approximated by that of a general equilibrium 
of monopolistic competition. This represents the third line of 
investigation to a reconciliation between the rationality of 
behaviour and the existence of involuntary unemployment.
Certainly the fluctuations are not and cannot be apprehended 
in the same way according to whether underemployment equilibrium 
is considered or not. The market equilibrium perspective generally 
leads to the uniqueness of that equilibrium being hypothesized - 
even if the theoretical framework used is far from warranting such 
a result. The variations in production and employment are then 
analysed as supply reactions to signals which are not easy to decipher.
For non-walrasian general equilibrium theory the task is simpler, 
although the fluctuation problem is not confronted: the theory
effectively implies the existence of a multiplicity of equilibria 
whose real co-ordinates are different. The variations of production 
and employment are then perceived as the transition from one equi­
librium to another.
Pure price adjustment, and pure quantity adjustment delineate 
a spectrum within which all combinations are possible. The major 
answers to what can well be called the challenge of short period 




























































































ends of the spectrum. This way of proceeding has certain advantages: 
it allows the answers to be written and interpreted in the language 
of a theory, viz., general equilibrium theory which at that point 
in time seemed to have achieved the status of a scientific research 
programme (Arrow and Hahn, 1971) , while the standard macroeconomic 
argument was being radically questioned (Clower, 1965; Leijonhufvud, 
1968) .
II THE COMMON STRUCTURE OF (QUASI-NON?) WALRASIAN REVOLUTIONS
Thus Macroeconomics has been questioned at first from within the 
walrasian model. A better way of understanding recent theoretical 
developments no longer takes as a starting point macroeconomic 
research as it had been identified by the very title of Keynes' 
book - "General theory of employment, interest and money" - but 
that of general equilibrium theory. The great achievement of this 
research lies more perhaps in the questions it asks than in the 
answers it gives. The reference model of microeconomics in effect 
has been saddled with a list of fundamental questions on its own 
validity. Its method of use is quite clear: the list of conditions
for its use is exhaustive or, which is the same, the situations in 
which the model is not applicable are made openly explicit. For 
example, it is clearly understood that the theory cannot be applied 
if a complete set of markets for future goods does not exist or 
if economic agents do not treat prices parametrically /e.g. in 
small economies/, or if institutions exogenous to the model which 
guarantee the consistency of plans of microeconomic agents do not 
exist, or if production is characterised by significantly increasing 
returns to scale, etc. etc.^
1) As Hahn notes, (1980c, p. 127): "Indeed, if it is the case that 
today General Equilibrium Theory is in some disarray, this is 
largely due to the work of General Equilibrium Theorists and 
not to any successful assault from outside". cf. also 




























































































How should the model be modified for it to apply to some of 
these situations? It is essentially with reference to the answers 
provided to this question that recent research on the foundations 
of macroeconomics must be evaluated."^ Frequently these answers have 
a keynesian flavour with some relevance to the problems of our time. 
They elaborate concepts of equilibrium qualified as "quasi" or "non- 
walrasian" according to whether or not they are consistent with the 
underemployment of men or of production capacity. What diversifies 
concepts of equilibrium has nothing to do with the problem of "co­
ordination" - the whole set of models being founded on the existence 
of a tatonnement process - but depends on the kinds of constraints 
which appear in the individual optimisation problems.
Microeconomic Foundations
Rationality simply means that economic agents take the best 
action open to them under perceived constraints. To demonstrate 
better the common links between theoretical approaches first all 
constraints will be described then later taken singly in order to 
reach a taxonomy of equilibrium concepts. ^
Maximise u^fx^, rru , o .) subject to the following constraints: 12
1 Jh -
= OJi + z.lIL =- m .l - PZ± >,o
2 Z • 1. ih v Zih N<Zih
2 ' Zik '<Zik -<Zik , k h
3 |’Ph := Ph ' zih S zih * zih '
•H"w.45
K h fi ' 9i '«ill * Zih <? 2ih Lpi
1) The viewpoint defended by Weintraub (1979) is that when considered 
in this way, the "walrasian research programme" appears as a 
progressive one.
2) For reasons that will become clear later, the formulation used 




























































































where the r goods are indexed by h, the m agents indexed by i, 
and x is the vector of consumption, w that of endowments, z that 
of net demands, and P a vector of prices. m, and m, are monetary 
balances at the beginning and end of the period and a, a vector of 
current information from which expectations are derived. (The 
barred variables will be defined at appropriate places). Constraints 
1 obviously must always be satisfied. Their consideration alone 
or, alternatively, with the other three allows at least four con­
cepts of temporary equilibrium to be defined.
Temporary competitive equilibrium
The absence of a complete set of future markets has many 
implications, the most significant of them being to give money 
something to do.  ̂ Such absence implies effectively that exchanges 
take place at all dates - and no longer at the beginning of time 
as in the Arrow-Debreu model. The sequential nature of the economy 
becomes then an essential characteristic of a monetary economy 
(Radner, 1968, 1974), in the sense that it is a necessary condition^1 2
1) The majority of concepts to be used here have a Hicksian link 
and a Swedish connection. The concept of temporary competitive 
equilibrium in particular represented one of the major contribu­
tions of "Value and Capital" (1939) and Hicks later devoted an
important chapter to it (Chap. VI) in "Capital and Growth" (1965). 
The modern development of this concept is due to Grandmont who 
has shown in a series of articles that the idea of temporary 
equilibrium could lead to a monetary theory and how it allowed 
some of the results of the neoclassical synthesis to be called 
into question: such as properties of homogeneity, the role
of monetary policy, etc. (Grandmont, 1973, 1977, 1982) - Grandmont 
and Laroque (1973, 1975).
2) It is not, however, a sufficient condition as will be seen in 





























































































for the existence of an equilibrium where the value of money is 
positive."^ A further consequence is the introduction of a form 
of uncertainty in the problem of decision-making by individual 
economic agents. This uncertainty is relative not only to the 
plurality of states of nature, but to the vector of prices which 
will clear markets in each of those states. Economic agents must 
also make forecasts and their expectation function will be one 
of the important ingredients of the programme which they try to 
resolve. This function makes expectations depend on present and 
past information possessed by the individual on the structure of the 
economy and which within the temporary competitive equilibrium 
framework is limited to the series of current and past prices and the 
rules of economic policy parameters used by the "government".
The utility function u. must therefore be undersood as an 
intertemporal index of utility which can be obtained as a solution 
of a dynamic programming problem: future period consumption levels
are derived from the information vector by the mediation of an 
expectation function. Only constraints 1 are evidently relevant 
for this type of model; they imply that the individual is sure to 
realise his current plan even if he has only faint confidence in 
his future plans. A temporary competitive equilibrium, therefore, 
is an equilibrium where present choices of agents are pre-reconciled, 
while their future plans are not co-ordinated. But the existence of 
an equilibrium is subject to severe restrictions and implies a 
series of conditions on the structure of expectations.
The reasons for this can be easily understood. An elasticity 
of expectation that is "too" strong produces an intertemporal sub­
stitution effect between goods whose direction can be opposite to 
that of the real balance effect. And even a unity elasticity of 
substitution can be "too" strong if the ratio between expected and 
current prices is greater than the marginal substitution rate at
The difficulty of proving the existence of such an equilibrium 
within Patinkin's model (1956) had been stressed by Hahn (1965) 
and solved by Grandmont: "The price of money is positive in 
equilibrium because people believe it will be positive with 




























































































the point of initial endowments (Grandmont, 1982, Ch. 1). For the 
same reason it is possible that monetary policy alone will be 
unable to control the interest rate or the nominal supply of money.^
For a temporary equilibrium to exist where money has a positive 
value, the expectations of some or all agents, relatively to prices 
or interest rate, must be largely insensitive to current prices 
and interest rates (Grandmont 1982). These conditions are unlikely to 
be fulfilled in an inflationary environment. Thus beyond the intro­
duction of an element of disequilibrium into a walrasian model 
(the non coordination of agents' future plans) the theory of tempo- 
rar” equilibrium reopens the controversy on the effectiveness of 
regulation mechanisms in a competitive economy and, notably, on the 
real balance effect: price flexibility is not a sufficient condition 
for the re-establishment of equilibrium and an excess supply in 
particular can exist at all positive prices. Keynes was "intuitively" 
right. But the spirit of the model is more Austrian than keynesian 
(Hicks, 1979) and the difficulties of establishing a walrasian equi­
librium do not imply in any case the existence of an underemployment 
equilibrium.
What, according to Hicks, represents a problem in competitive 
temporary equilibrium theory is the mutual interdependence of equi­
librium prices and expectations in the short period (a week).
Current prices are effectively determined taking expectations into 
account and expectations taking into account equilibrium prices. This
simultaneous and mutual determination transforms a theory conceived
2)as dynamic into a "quasi-static" model. 1
1) Hicks (1965, pp. 71-72) had already stressed the limits of
monetary policy. Although he referred to the existence of a 
"spectrum of interest rates", the reasoning was qualitatively 
the same: the possibility of affecting the spectrum of interest
rates, controlling some of them depends on the behaviour of 
agents' expectations.
2) cf.(Hicks, 1965 pp. 73-74; 1977 pp VI-VIII) Lindhall's method
on which the Hicksian approach is directly based implies that 
the length of the period of temporary equilibrium is chosen so 
as to be equal to the expectation lag. The chain of periods is 
then naturally derived: each period leaves to that following
a capital stock and a determined value of expected variables.
When the expectation lag is reduced the length of the period 
is also reduced. In the short period walrasian equilibrium 
model the simultaneous determination of prices and expectations 




























































































Starting from this proposition two lines of investigation are 
opened; the first seeks to substantiate Hicks' suggestion of in­
troducing a lag into the model. Current prices partially determine 
expectations which in turn determine future prices. Obviously the 
simplest method of eliminating any feedback between prices and 
expectations in the current period is by assuming that prices are 
fixed at the beginning of the period (general equilibrium with 
rationing) or that expectations are exogenous. A second line of 
investigation on the contrary considers that temporary competitive 
equilibrium theory contains "too" many potential disequilibria.
It should be possible to introduce greater co-ordination into 
exchange agents' future plans (walrasian equilibrium of rational 
expectations).
"Non-walrasian" equilibria with fixed prices
If prices do not change instantaneously to clear markets a 
convenient hypothesis is that of considering them rigid in the 
short period. The fixed price method (Hicks, 1965, Ch. VII) re­
presents, therefore, the methodological justification of general 
equilibrium theory with rationing.^ This does not imply that 
prices are invariant but are determined outside the model, and, 
more precisely, outside the temporary equilibrium period. During 
the period only quantities are free to change while prices are 1
1) The fertile matrix of this class of models is the fundamental 
article by Clower (1965) on the keynesian counter revolution, 
in that it gave a theoretical content - in terms of the 
general equilibrium model -to the concept of effective demand. 
This concept is obtained by considering an additional constraint 
generated by imperfect wage flexibility in individual economic 
agents' optimisation problems. Thus emphasis was not put on 
the rigidity of one price but on the non-instantaneity of its 
adaptation. This course was very similar to that of Patinkin 
(1965, Ch. 13) which dealt in a symmetric fashion with optimisa­
tion by a firm. It remained for Barro and Grossman (1971; 1976) 
to synthesize the two contributions into a general disequilibrium 
model, while the existence of an equilibrium where only wages 
are rigid had been established by Glustoff (1968). Thus,origin- 




























































































subject to inter-period adjustment. The existence of disequilibria 
(in the walrasian sense) implies, then, that in the determination 
of his plans, the individual takes into account not only price signals 
but also the quantity signals he gets from the market.
Suppose that these signals are objectively determined; the 
economic agent thus resolves the optimisation problem defined by the 
utility function u. - where must now be interpreted as also
containing information relative to present and past quantity con­
straints - and constraints 1 and 2. z ^  and z^h represent the 
maximum quantities of good h which can be sold or bought. Taking 
into account these signals, an optimum transactions vector can be 
determined. The simplest way of describing the process leading to 
equilibrium is to use a tatonnement procedure. Dreze (1975) chose 
this method. Agents receive a vector of signals which establishes 
the upper and lower limits to their exchange opportunities. They 
then determine their constrained demands and supplies on all markets 
and transmit this information to the auctioneer. The auctioneer 
revises quantity signals until an equilibrium in transactions is 
reached. A Dreze equilibrium is a fixed point in this tatonnement 1
1) cont.
were prevented from changing "freely". The information problem 
evidently appeared "en exergue" and the very absence of an 
auctioneer in a general equilibrium model seemed sufficient to 
produce keynesian results. Hence the apparent similarity between 
the path taken by Leijonhufvud and that of the new microeconomics 
of employment and inflation (Phelps et al., 1970), as shown by 
the numerous references to Alchian (1970) in Leijonhufvud1s book. 
But obviously the similarity is only apparent for the methodolo­
gical approaches are radically different. While a spill-over 
effect across markets underlies the effective demand concept a 
la Clower which cannot be understood outside a general equilib­
rium model framework, the new microeconomics couched its argument 
in terms of a partial equilibrium analysis - essentially of the 
labour market - and could not conceive of unemployment other than 
as a transitory stage in an adjustment process (Phelps 1970) or 
an entirely voluntary phenomenon generated by a misperception of 




























































































process in the space of quantity constraints. Three hypotheses 
are needed to reach this result: balanced exchanges, voluntary
exchanges, i.e. no individual can be forced to exchange beyond his 
intentions; rationed agents all belong to the same side of the 
market.
As Grandmont (1977) has noted, in the Dreze model there is no 
exchange of information relative to the intensity of rationing 
experienced by individuals, for individuals are limited in the 
messages they send to the market. Exchanges only take place when 
quantity constraints form a coherent whole, i.e. in an equilibrium.
It is in the nature of the method used that it cannot generate in­
formation on the divergence between intention and realisation: in 
a general equilibrium model individual agents' plans are realised 
at the equilibrium point. Hence the difficulty in giving a measur­
able content to the notion of involuntary decisions.^ A possible 
solution would be to seek a measure of disequilibrium by comparing 
the solution vectors of (two) different optimisation programmes 
by norming the relevant vector space. Call x the solution vector 
associated with the programme s. And consider the programme s' 
which differs from s only in the existence of a supplementary 
constraint. The comparison between x and x' - the solution of 
the second programme - provides an indication of the intensity 
of frustration of economic agents as a result of the introduction 
of an additional constraint. This, after all, is the method 
underlying the Clower's dual decision hypothesis. In Clower's model, 
however, s is the programme associated with competitive general 
equilibrium theory and its solution x has only a notional character 
in that it is not communicated to the market.
The hypothesis that an economic agent does not take into account 
the constraint he perceives in the market where he expresses his 
effective demand allows a generalisation of the dual decision theory. 
By definition his effective demand for good h is the solution of the 1
1) Refer in particular to the article by T. Haavelmo who presents 





























































































optimisation problem defined by constraints 1 and 2'. z^h is there­
fore obtained by considering the set of constraints except that 
concerning good h (Benassy 1975a). The set of effective demands 
z ^  is obtained by the solution of n different optimisation problems, 
n being the number of markets. However, the transactions are a solu­
tion of the programme s' which simultaneously considers all the 
constraints, like in the Dreze model. The comparison between effective 
demand and transactions gives a measure of the intensity of the 
rationing confronting the individual. Therefore markets are not 
balanced in the space of effective demands. A system of rationing 
schemes associates agents' transactions in a market with the set 
of effective demands expressed in that market. It represents a 
mechanism for allocating goods between incompatible demands, but 
is not necessarily known to individuals. Therefore it has to be 
supplemented by a perceived rationing scheme "which depicts the 
way agent i views the relation between his actions and their con­
sequences" (Benassy, 1977, p. 149). The perceived rationing scheme 
has the same properties as the objective rationing scheme and en­
compasses the latter at the point of effective exchange.^ The two 
relations represent data of the problem. An equilibrium in Benassy's
sense or K- equilibrium is a fixed point of the tatonnement process
2)in the space of effective demands.
For a given system of prices the equilibrium allocations in the 
Dreze and Benassy models are identical. However, the problem of 1
1) These properties include to some extent the hypotheses formulated 
by Dreze. Equilibrium of transactions; voluntary exchange. The 
third hypothesis - rationing on one side of the market only -
is not a necessary hypothesis in a Benassy type model, since 
markets can be characterised by the existence of frictions 
(Benassy 1977; 1982) .
2) A K- equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, where every agent con­
siders the actions of other agents as given. Therefore it is 
possible to interpret general equilibria at fixed prices in 
terms of non co-operative game theory. In particular the non- 
co-operative equilibrium of Malinvaud - Younes (1977) includes 
the notion of K- equilibrium when prices are fixed. The non­
co-operative behaviour is the source of the inefficiency found in 
fixed price equilibria models. cf. also Bohm-Levine (1979); 




























































































utilisable information in the dynamic study of the sequence of 
short period equilibria remains unresolved. Benassy's model cer­
tainly produces some information - the set of effective demands - 
but it is not quite satisfactory because of the somewhat artificial 
character of the process which determines it. An agent's effective 
demand vector remains potential because it does not necessarily 
satisfy his budget constraint. The disequilibrium measures thus 
obtained cannot therefore provide the foundation of a price dynamics. 
Certainly they always have the "right" sign (Benassy, 1982) but 
their quantitative importance should be treated with caution.
Because of the distinction established between effective demand 
and transaction, Benassy's framework is generally used in the 
macroeconomic applications of general equilibrium theory with 
rationing."^ In general three goods are considerd but there are 
only two markets (a good and labour) while money is considered as 
representing one side of all transactions. It is then possible 
to proceed towards a typology of disequilibria according to the 
value of exogenous variables. Malinvaud (1977) by using an 
asymmetric treatment of firms and households - because the good 
is not storable, enterprises expectations were not taken into 
account - distinguished three types of "disequilibrium": classical
unemployment (excess demand in the market for goods, excess supply 
in the labour market); keynesian unemployment (excess supply on both 
markets); repressed inflation (excess demand on both markets). The 
reconciliation within the same theoretical framework of the classical 
(Pigou) and neokeynesian approaches to unemployment represented a 
fundamental contribution of general equilibrium theory with rationing 
even though the probability of classical unemployment was considered 
low by virtue of a possible asymmetry of price adaptations. It 
became possible to establish a one to one correspondence between the 
type of disequilibrium and the constellation of exogenous variables 
(prices and quantity of money) and to found a typology of economic 1
1) cf. in particular Barro and Grossman (1971), Benassy (1977), 




























































































policy rules adapted to each situation.^ It is important to note 
that the correspondence established between the type of disequilibrium 
and the structure of prices presupposes a relationship between the 
production sold and the current demand for input in the very short 
period of temporary equilibrium. It is difficult to find a founda­
tion for such a relation because it implies a very particular 
structure of expectations. If stocks and expectations of enter­
prises are explicitly introduced into the model, the map of dis- 
equilibria becomes infinitely more complex. First of all, a fourth 
type of situation must be distinguished where enterprises are rationed 
on both markets (excess supply of product, excess demand for labour), 
qualified as "underconsumption" (Mullbauer and Portes, 1978) or as 
"overcapitalisation" (Fitoussi and Georgescu-Roegen, 1980). Second, 
the constellation of prices and monetary balances is no longer suf­
ficient to characterise disequilibria from the viewpoint of economic 
policy. This characterisation will depend also on the profile of 
constraints expected in future periods. Here, the number of possible 
cases becomes very large to the point where it would be particularly 
difficult for economic policy to decipher the current period. For 
example, a situation which would be characterised as keynesian 
unemployment with regard to current period demands, could very well 
correspond to classical unemployment if demand expectations by enter­
prises were sufficiently optimistic. (Neary and Stiglitz, 1982; 
Benassy, 1980 ; 1982). when expectations are given by stochastic 
functions the map of current period disequilibria is not modified 
but the conclusions of economic policy can be inverted: for instance 
a fall (and not a rise) in wages would permit an increase in the 
employment level under keynesian unemployment, when production by 
enterprises is not limited by pessimistic expectations of future 
demand. 1
1) This correspondence has been questioned by Hildenbrand and Hilden- 
brand (1978). Fitoussi and Georgescu-Roegen (1980) have shown 
that there may not exist rationing rules to achieve a classical 
equilibrium and that the conclusions of economic policy derived 
from the Malinvaud model depended on the particular specification 
chosen for the utility function. In the general case a rule 
of economic policy directed at reducing keynesian unemployment 




























































































This explains, perhaps, the exploratory nature of the dynamic 
analysis of sequences of temporary equilibrium with rationing 
(e.g. Bohm, 1978, 1981), and the need to base those analyses on simple 
and specific models with relation to the matter under study.
This strategy has proven enlightening, notably in the study of the 
medium term evolution of distribution variables and of the persistent 
or transitory character of different types of unemployment. (Malinvaud, 
1980a) .
Thus, general equilibrium theory with rationing allows the 
establishment of a typology of equilibria and bases its analysis 
on rational behaviour in the sense of choice theory. Nevertheless, 
a necessary condition for the existence of an underemployment equi­
librium remains the rigidity of one or several prices.^ On this 
point even Pigou would not have objected. Also, in fixprice models 
the novelty is not in the initial hypothesis but in the detailed 
and explicit discussion of its consequences. Therefore, the basis 
of the hypothesis of exogenous prices is a major question. It is 
true that a converging series of reasons which seem to militate 
in favour of this hypothesis exist-and some of them have been noted
in the first part of this paper - but they are not integrated
2 )into a coherent theoretical analysis and they are vulnerable 
when questioned from an individual rationality viewpoint. Why do 1
1) Therefore it should not be surprising that the real balance 
effect plays an important role in these models. When the 
real wage corresponds to its walrasian level, underemployment 
is generally the result of a "too low" level of the quantity of 
money.
2) The theory of implicit contracts does not justify the existence 
of market disequilibria, contrary to what Solow has said (1979, 
1980). This, on the one hand, implies the real wage rigidity 
(and not money wage rigidity) and on the other, is a theory
of full employment. The existence of long term nominal contracts 
(Fisher, 1977, 1980) and of transaction costs (Howitt, 1979) is 
another justification. Keynes' invocation of the rigidity of 





























































































economic agents not exhaust their exchange opportunities? This 
recurring question establishes the failure of this type of approach 
(Barro, 1979; Kantor, 1979; Lucas, 1980a; etc....). But the criticism 
is not as well founded as it seems in that it confuses the rationality 
of an external observer endowed with powerful analytical instruments 
with that of an economic agent who deciphers only part of his own 
economic environment. There is no decentralised theory of price 
formation and the assumption of their instantaneous adaptation 
cannot be deduced from principles of individual behaviour. The 
theory of price determination outside equilibrium still has a long 
way to go (Fisher, 1981). So the two schools of thought confront 
the same issue, but are solving it by diametrically opposite as­
sumptions. Hence the impossibility, contrary to what has been ex­
pressed by Lucas in recent writings (1980a), of eliminating "free" 
parameters from theoretical structures: an impossibility which under­
lines the unavoidable ideological content of economics.
The theory of "disequilibria" had been presented at the beginning 
as the theory of imperfectly coordinated systems^ but the models 
which have been discussed are all founded on tatonnement processes, 
which ensure a perfect coordination through quantities. Hence the 
allocation of goods in equilibrium depends on the rationing scheme, 
which cannot itself be deduced from agents' behaviour. In some sense, 
therefore, fix-price models do not really present a theory of 
quantity determination: the above critical remarks concerning the 
assumption of the instantaneous adaptation of prices applies, pari passu, 
to the case of instantaneous adaptation of quantities.
Non-walrasian equilibria with endogenous prices
If price determination were the object of individual decisions 
the beginnings of a solution to the preceding problem could be 1
1) cf. Leijonhufvud (1968; 1981). The coordination problem cannot
generally be treated in models favouring microeconomic founda­




























































































offered. Price rigidity would no longer be a cause but a consequence 
of underemployment equilibrium. The most general solution consists 
of supposing that an economic agent adapts his prices to explore the 
more or less constraining character of the quantity signals he rec­
eives from the market. Out of walrasian equilibrium, as Arrow had 
noted (1959), agents are no longer confronted writh infinitely elas­
tic demand curves. Monopolistic competition, more than perfect 
competition, would then constitute the reference model of macro­
economics. In such a structure microeconomic agents determine 
their prices on the basis of conjectured supply and demand functions. 
The existence of a general equilibrium of monopolistic competition 
has been established by Negishi (1961) but until recently had not 
been linked to the problem of the microeconomic foundations of 
macroeconomics.
Benassy's model (1976, 1982) accomplished this. Consider the 
optimisation programme defined by constraints 1 and 3. Goods are 
distinguished by the markets where they are exchanged and by the 
individuals who control their prices. For example individual i 
controls the subset of good h^, while the prices of other goods 
are viewed as rigid (p̂  = p^, h ^ h^). The conjectured functions 
of demand and supply are represented respectively by z ^  and z ^  
p^, 0^ ( c k) ; where 9̂  are their parameters estimated from the 
information set ( c k). The conjectured curves obviously pass 
through the observed point. The solution of this programme gives 
a price vector considered as optimal taking into account the 
agents' conjectures. The formulation adopted here is rather gen­
eral in that it allows the simultaneous consideration of fix-price 
and flex-price markets. A non-walrasian equilibrium with endogenous 
prices is a K- equilibrium where economic agents do not perceive 
any incentive to modify their price. That is to say a K- equilibrium 
at the optimal price vector Px. ^  )̂ if one congfdej-g a 12
1) A problem stressed by Benassy (1982, p. 140), similar to that found 
here in the study of competitive temporary equilibrium is that
the determination of p^ and Q . is simultaneous, while 0. is also 
a function of p. via cr̂. Another concept of eauilibrium1with endo-c  i  x. J.genous prices has been defined by Grandmont and Laroque (1977) .
There prices are fixed by entrepreneurs at the beginning of the 
period and are not subject to revision within the period .
2) The proof of the existence of a K- equilibrium with flexible 
prices requires, however, beyond all the usual assumptions,





























































































macroeconomic model, classical unemployment disappears as a category 
of the analysis insofar as it is always optimal for an entrepreneur 
who determines his price to satisfy demand at the current price. But 
it would seem that keynesian unemployment would also disappear unless 
wage rigidity is assumed, or a special concept of underemployment is 
used : an equilibrium E (Z, P) of the model would be characterised 
as an underemployment equilibrium if another equilibrium E' (Z', P') 
existed such that the employment level would be higher. This is the 
concept used by Hart (1979) in a model where agents have monopoly 
power but know their true exchange possibilities. "Unemployment" 
is then the result of monopolistic behaviour by trade unions. ^
The spontaneous equilibrium of the model can therefore be character­
ised by a low level of employment and activity. Fiscal policy by
virtue of a process analagous to that of the multiplier would allow
a higher level of employment. This definition of a state of under­
employment does not seem convincing insofar as it could also be 
applied to a walrasian model. In such a model, if equilibrium is 
not unique, and if an equilibrium where the level of employment is 
maximum existed, any other state of the model could be characterised 
by underemployment equilibrium. Furthermore, it is possible to show 
that in the walrasian model the level of employment and output dep­
ends in equilibrium on the importance of the (balanced) budget of
the State (Tobin and Buiter, 1976).
A possible way out is to assume that the existence of monopoly 
powers is not intrinsic to the model but simply reflects the exist­
ence of disequilibria (Hahn, 1978). The full employment walrasian 
equilibrium always represents one of the solutions of the model. The 
structure of the economy is thus competitive, but price determination 
is decentralised and is the subject of individual decisions. To 
reconcile these two contradictory characteristics, Hahn assumes 
that agents' monopoly powers are not exogenous to the model. An 
agent who does not meet any quantity constraint could accept 
the market price. If no agent receives quantity signals, *4
1) "The trade union" determines the wage rate in an optimal fashion. 





























































































walrasian equilibrium is reached. On the contrary if an agent is
constrained in some way, he conjectures that altering prices would
allow him to relax the quantity constraints confronting him. A
conjecture function retraces the relation established by the agent
between the price he announces and the quantity he thinks he can
exchange in excess of his constraint. This formulation assumes
that the conjectured supply and demand functions are kinked at
the current price.^ For the rest the model is formally similar
2)to that of Benassy. A conjectural equilibrium is a Dreze 
equilibrium where agents' conjectures are confirmed, i.e. a state 
of the economy where agents do not perceive any incentive to modify 
their responses to the market signals they receive. Hahn has 
proved the existence of a conjectural equilibrium where only one 
side of the market is rationed, in the sense that the conjecture 
functions of agents who are on the long side of the market are not 
infinitely elastic. This characteristic implies a particular 
structure of information; non rationed agents do not attempt to 
take advantage of the "rationings" of other agents. It would be 
interesting to know whether under the opposite assumptions, only 
a walrasian equilibrium could be achieved.
A conjectural equilibrium can be qualified as an underemployment 
equilibrium for the reasons stated previously, namely because a 
state of the model exists where the employment level is higher 
(walrasian equilibrium).
The assumption that conjectures are exogenous is considered 
by some (McCallum, 1980b)as an ad hoc assumption which would 
establish the vulnerability of this type of model. If perfect 
rationality is imposed onto agents' conjectures the walrasian 1
1) A class of similar models, that begin from the very outset with 
the assumption that functions are kinked, has been presented 
by Negishi (1977; 1979).
2) The strong distinction established by Drazen (1980) between 
Benassy's and Hahn's model is very artificial. The processes 
of price and quantity determination are simultaneous in Hahn as 
they are in Benassy. It is thus not on this point, contrary to 




























































































equilibrium would become the only solution of the model.^ It has 
already been stressed that this criticism rests on a confusion 
between the concepts of rationality and centralisation. Strictly 
speaking in a centralised economy an entity external to the market 
can make experiments (assuming that the cost of those experiments 
is either zero or independent of their number) so as to discover 
the "true" parameters of excess demand functions. But to 
stipulate that in a centralised economy every agent - who special­
izes in information on his immediate environment - proceeds in 
the same way, is a requirement that has nothing to do with rationality.
The study of non-walrasian models could lead the 'naif' to ask
certain questions: it has been proved unimpeachably that price
rigidity leads to unemployment and that an economy with monopolistic
structures generally functions at too low a level of activity. But,
these results give a strong impression of "déjà-vu" and, thus, one
is led to wonder whether improved solutions to macroeconomic problems
have been found. But it is not, it seems, on this question that the
2)evolution of recent theory must be judged. The reconciliation of 
macroeconomics and rationality is a precondition for progress in 
the keynesian approach and this concern is the subject of the new 
developments in macroeconomic theory.
Perhaps it is useful at this stage to reconstruct the story of 
this reconciliation, as I see it.
The "general theory" could be interpreted as containing two de­
finitions of effective demand, which are generally confused because
1)
2)
Hahn (1977b and c) has shown that for conjectures that are "local­
ly" rational - the first derivatives of the conjectures functions 
are correct - an underemployment conjectural equilibrium would 
exist. For a discussion of the rationality of conjectures see 
Drazen (1980). But for reasons to be illustrated in the text 
this question does not seem pertinent.
Even if a positive answer could be given cf.





























































































of the keynesian assumption that short period expectations are always 
realised. The first concept defines total demand as primarily 
a function of income (for a given state of long term expectations).
A second definition considers effective demand as that value of 
total demand expected by entrepreneurs, which corresponds to their 
current decisions on prices, employment and production. ̂  It seems 
that the concept of conjecture applies particularly well to this 
definition and that by assumption entrepreneurs in the keynesian 
theory are in conjectural equilibrium. Now if households in their 
capacity as consumers and labour suppliers are considered as "price 
takers" they will adapt their behaviour to the price vector announced 
by entrepreneurs according to a process analogous to that defined by 
the fix-price models: their effective demand according to the
first definition is the constrained demand which they communicate 
to the market. If the value of the constrained demand is equal to 
that of expected demand, entrepreneurs will not have any incentive 
to modify their decisions on price, employment and production since 
their conjectures are confirmed by the market. In this "rereading" 
of the general theory there is no reason for entrepreneurs to 
modify wages, since once their employment decision is taken, the 
real wage is the profit maximising one at the employment level 
chosen: "The volume of employment is uniquely related to a given 
level of real wages - not the other way round". (Keynes, 1936, 
p. 30).
Walrasian eguilibrium of rational expectations
A careful distinction must be made between the problem of 
knowledge and that of rationality: to assert that a greedy agent 
makes the best use of his perceived environment tells us nothing 
of the difference between what is perceived and what is "true", 
nor as to the conditions of their identity. 1
1) This interpretation correspond^ almost literally to Keynes'
definition: "The value of D /The proceeds which entrepreneurs 
expect to receive/. At the point of the aggregate demand 
function, where it is intersected by the aggregate supply 





























































































The confusion of these two problems results in the disappearance 
of learning processes, that is to say the adaptation delays or, 
as some people prefer to call them, the "free" parameters. But in 
fact this procedure amounts to selecting a particular value of 
these parameters: a zero adaptation lag or an infinite speed of 
adjustment. It is difficult to understand the reasons why such 
restrictions should confer a greater generality to a theory. Cer­
tainly the argument is not of a theoretical nature and the 
empirical considerations which would justify it do not seem to be 
conclusive (Lucas, 1980, pp. 711-712) unless it is demanded
that the economy should be simultaneously in a state of temporary 
equilibrium (market clearing) and of stationary equilibrium (ra­
tional expectations), i.e. that one considers only situations 
where the learning process has ceased (Hahn, 1982).
The concept of competitive temporary equilibrium is a powerful 
analytical instrument, in that it allows a dynamic evolution to 
be accounted for without otherwise stipulating the existence 
of a disequilibrium. But it contains "too many" potential disequi- 
libria: the absence of co-ordination of future plans makes
the present configuration of the economy too dependent on the past 
and not enough on the future. The problem arises because the 
expectation function is specified in an ad hoc manner. By con­
struction the model implies that agents are rational, know how to 
solve their optimisation problem and are able to exhaust their 
exchange opportunities. Why not apply the same rationality principle 
to their expectation behaviour? The expectation function in fact 
describes "the theory" of the agent as to the generation of future 1
1) The following could be a justification: - all the parameters
of the model would have to be derived from a programme of opti­
misation by microeconomic agents. The consideration of the 
adaptation lag or the adjustment speed is external to that 
programme. This is true but it does not allow the justification 
of any particular choice. Perhaps it may be necessary to recall 
that in a competitive model price determination does not proceed 
from "individual experiment" but from "market experiment" and that 
this is not the work of individual economic agents but of a 




























































































variables relevant to his current optimisation problem. If this 
theory shows itself to be false in that it leads to systematic 
forecast errors, the agent will have to revise it. Expectations 
are rational when they lead to forecasts which, in comparison with 
realisations do not induce the agent to modify his "theory". This 
assumption implies that forecasting errors are not correlated with 
any of the information available to the agent when he forms his 
forecasts and that they are, therefore, serially independent and 
distributed around a zero mean. This amounts to a steady state 
equilibrium condition: expectations are rational when they lead 
to agents taking actions whose results do not contradict their 
expectations. To consider the rational expectation of a variable 
as the "true" mathematical expectation of that variable conditional 
on the information set available to agents^ , is a particular form 
of the hypothesis, although generally used (Lucas, 1972b; Sargent, 
1973; Sargent and Wallace, 1975; Barro, 1976).
Consider the optimisation programme defined by the utility 
function u^ and constraints 1. Suppose, on the other hand, that 
the information set contains everything agent i needs to know 
to have complete information. Finally, suppose function u is 
quadratic while excess demand functions are linear or log-linear.  ̂
The perfect foresight equilibrium is, then, the certainty equivalent 
of the rational expectation equilibrium. The model has the same 
properties as the Arrow-Debreu model, the assumption of perfect 
forecasts being a substitute for that of the existence of a 
complete set of contingent markets. Of course this type of model 
does not try to explain unemployment since markets are always in 
equilibrium, but fluctuations. So far the introduction of uncertainty 
leads only to random deviations around the path of perfect foresight.
This can hardly be considered a theory of business cycles. Something 
else is needed for cycles to be generated. 1
1) Adding a random variable not correlated to the information set 
to the conditional mathematical expectation gives a more general 
version (Sargent and Wallace, 1976) but this is rarely used in 
the literature.
2) Because functions are linear> solutions do not differ other than 




























































































Expectations are calculated by applying present and past data 
available to economic agents to the representative model of the 
economy. However the use of the relevant model
with incomplete information can lead to some fluctuations. The 
reason is simple: in a sequential equilibrium model where techno­
logy and preferences are given changes in production and employment 
from one period to tire next can only result from a change in 1 he 
state of nature. Incomplete information can lead to perceiving 
what is actually a purely nominal perturbation as a change in the 
state of nature. The intertemporal substitution induced by a varia­
tion .in current prices (wages) relatively to expected prices 
(wages) is supposed to be strong enough to generate sizeable supply 
changes (Barro, 1976; Lucas, 1977). Lucas (1972b) has shown, within 
the framework of an intergenerational model, that monetary shocks 
can generate real effects by confusing signals, thus aggravating 
the difficulty of distinguishing between absolute and relative price 
changes.
The possibility of cycles therefore rests entirely on a particular 
specification of the information set. As Tobin (1980; 1981) has 
noted, this possibility presupposes an asymmetry of information 
between sellers and buyers which really has no theoretical 
foundation. More generally, the set of models which try to explain 
fluctuations as equilibrium phenomena, presupposes that monetary 
aggregates are not observable in the current period. Now in most 
countries current monetary data are available. Therefore the 
assumption of incomplete information is as vulnerable from the 
viewpoint of rationality as the assumption of price rigidity (Barro, 
1981). Thus equilibrium theory does not really provide a convincing 
explanation of economic fluctuations. The problem seems to be of 
the same nature as that of the rationality of conjectures: how 
should the optimum information set be determined? Which are the 
conditions necessary for this optimum set not to cover the complete 




























































































Works on this question are much less numerous than those on log- 
linear macroeconomic models which assume the problem to have been 
solved. The question is important though: on the one hand the
information behaviour of the individual agent must be rational for 
expectations to be rational^ : on the other hand the incompleteness 
of information presupposes a certain irrationality or implies an 
ad hoc assumption on the comparative costs of the acquisition of 
information and of macroeconomic fluctuations.
This type of analysis gives particular importance to unperceived 
monetary shocks as a primary cause of economic fluctuations. Therefore 
a Phillips curve can exist in the short period, but does not offer 
any opportunity for intervention to economic policy. This is the 
well known proposition about the ineffectiveness of economic policy 
which is derived from a set of equilibrium rational expectations 
models. In general, this ineffectiveness rests on a particular 
macroeconomic specification of the theory whose fundamental equation 
describes the behaviour of suppliers on the labour market or on the 
product market: total supply is the sum of a constant and of a term 
representing the expectation error about the general price level.
If this term is zero, and its mean is zero from the assumption of 
rational expectation, systematic policies of aggregate demand re­
gulation have no effect on the level of employment and production.
This equation is known as the Lucas supply function (Lucas and Rapping, 
1970), and the intergenerational model presented by Lucas (1972b) 
is considered as its micreconomic foundation. But, in fact, the 
reduced form which it is possible to derive from the latter model, 
is a relation between the equilibrium level of production, the equi­
librium level of prices and the probability distribution of the 
price level (Azariadis, 1981). Moreover the only neutrality propo­
sition that can be derived starting from Lucas' model is highly 
restrictive. This point deserves further analysis. 1
1) This requirement of the model has itself been the subject of 
controversies (Taylor, 1975; Blanchard, 1976; B. Friedman, 




























































































In a temporary competitive equilibrium model, the excess demand 
functions are not generally homogeneous with respect to current
prices and money balances. The reason is simple: the absence of 
money illusion which characterizes these models implies that an 
equiproportional variation of the set of prices (current and expected) 
and of the quantity of money leaves the excess demand functions un­
changed. For this property to apply in the short period a unit 
elasticity of expectation would be necessary (Grandmont, 1977) .
This restriction - expected prices always being proportional to current 
prices - is an ad hoc assumption in that it cannot be deduced from 
fundamental principles of rational behaviour. However, it is 
possible to show that a particular category of monetary policy is 
neutral on condition that agents believe in its neutrality (Grandmont, 1982). Suppose 
that the government announces it will increase the quantity of money 
in the current period by means of transfers proportional to monetary 
balances held by each agent, with a proportionality coefficient equal 
to A. This kind of monetary policy is chosen to avoid distribution 
effects which, of course, have real consequences. If agents believe in 
the neutrality assumption their price expectations will be homogeneous 
of first degree with respect to current prices and the A parameter. 
Therefore, this type of policy measure will be neutral. If monetary 
policy consists of announcing a vector of A parameters applicable 
to current and future periods, the neutrality proposition is main­
tained."^ But if the monetary authorities give advance notice of a 
modification in the time profile of A parameters, monetary policy - 
it goes without saying perfectly anticipated - will have real conse­
quences. This is due to the liquidity constraints to which agents
2 )are exposed in different periods. 1
1) Even if the government does not announce its monetary policy its 
effect will be neutral if all agents have a positive monetary 
balance. In fact it is sufficient for agents to look at their 
own balances to discover parameter A. For a scaLar change of the 
quantity of external money to have real effects, it is, on the 
contrary, necessary that some agents should not have monetary 
balances. Since in Lucas' model the new generations do not have 
an initial monetary balance this second condition is satisfied. 
This would seem the only source of non-neutrality in this type 
of model (See Grandmont, 1982, Ch. 1).
For a proof of this result cf. Grandmont (1982, Ch. 1). A similar 





























































































If we consider a model with internal money, the neutrality 
proposition becomes even more specific: an equiproportional variation 
of initial monetary balances and of bank money is neutral if agents 
believe in its neutrality (Grandmont, 1982, Ch. II). Once again 
this proposition reaffirms the neutrality of a reform of the 
monetary unit: such a reform is neutral not just because it applies
to monetary balances held but because it modifies in the same propor­
tion the total liabilities and assets expressed in monetary units 
(Tobin, 1980, Ch. II). Contrary to Lucas' suggestion (1981), the 
analysis of this kind of policy measure does not exhaust the study 
of the consequences of monetary policy. Therefore the non-neutrality 
of monetary shocks is the general case even when they are completely 
expected.^ What is clear, on the contrary, is that the proposition 
of ineffectiveness of monetary policy has been demonstrated within 
the framework of a very special model and for a type of policy measure 
which is also very special, a change in the scale of monetary unit. 
Certainly this is an interesting result but it could not constitute 
the basis for a general recommendation of economic policy in view 
of the extremely specific nature of the theoretical structure that 
generates it. Nevertheless this result has been without caution in­
corporated into a series of macroeconomic models (Lucas, 1973;
Sargent, 1973; Sargent and Wallace, 1975, 1976; Barro, 1976;
McCallum, 1978; etc...), which have become frames of reference for 
economic policy debates (McCallum, 1979, 1980a; Lucas, 1980b; 
Grossman, 1980). Now, it is worth repeating that in the general 
case it can be shown that a systematic monetary policy will always 
have an effect on the equilibrium level of production and employ­
ment because it influences the terms of trade between present and 
future. This proof has been produced within the framework of the 
very model that is the foundation of the general equilibrium theory 
of rational expectations: i.e. Samuelson's intergenerational model 
(Azariades, 1981; Hahn, 1982; Grandmont, 1982). 1
1) There are a number of reasons why changes in the quantity of 
money should not be neutral. They are both theoretical and 
institutional (cf. Fisher, 1980). Generally they imply either 
that a change of monetary aggregates has distribution effects; 
or that it generates a change in the capital stock through its 




























































































At this stage in the analysis an important point deserves 
particular emphasis. Even if previous criticisms are rejected, 
the neutrality proposition of systematic monetary policy rests, 
necessarily, on the assumption of the uniqueness of the equilibrium. 
But, in general, the equilibrium of an Arrow-Debreu model is not 
unique. For example, this is true when production is characterised 
by constant returns to scale. An increase in the quantity of 
money, then, can lead to an equiproportional increase of production 
and employment or be divided between price change and quantity 
change or, finally, generate only a price increase without any 
modification of the real magnitudes in the economy. Any of these 
consequences can be rationally expected and therefore be self-ful- 
tilling (Hahn, 1980 a and b; 1982). It goes without saying that 
several equilibrium paths of rational expectations exist under this 
assumption and that in the majority of them agents must also form 
quantity expectations. Therefore the real coordinates of the 
economy would not be invariant with respect to monetary policy.
Even if the assumption of uniqueness is accepted, the stability 
and convergence problems are not resolved in the least. If the system 
is globally stable an infinity of paths which converge towards 
equilibrium exists. Each of these paths represents a rational expect­
ation. The dynamic evolution of the system therefore remains in­
determinate. If the system is globally unstable all the paths will 
be divergent. Only under the assumption that equilibrium is a 
saddle point is there a unique solution which allows the calculation 
of a rational expectation path (Burmeister, 1980; Begg, 1982 , Ch. 111)1 
The general case, therefore,seems to be that of the indeterminacy of 
the dynamics of the system. Expectations rationally formed will be 
divergent and no mechanism will ensure their return to a convergent 
path, since the stochastic behaviour of variables remains indetermin­
ate (Burmeister 1980).
For all these reasons and more the proposition of ineffectiveness 
of monetary policy in particular and of stabilisation policy in 1
1) By definition an equilibrium is a saddle point if only one con­




























































































general remains extremely limited.^' of course it is always 
possible to modify some relations of an elementary macroeconomic 
model adding a variable here and a lag there, considering deviations 
rather than levels, in such a way as to re-establish this proposition 
(McCallum, 1980a). But the lack of foundation, both for the model 
and for the modifications introduced, damages the credibility of 
this undertaking. Nevertheless it would seem that this proposition 
has been taken seriously and even been interpreted as representing 
the basis of the policy of monetary discipline recommended by 
Milton Friedman. But this is only one of the doctrinal contra­
dictions generated by the new classical school. In the singularly 
limited domain to which it is applicable, the "theorem" of ineffect­
iveness of economic policy states that any systematic monetary 
rule, whatever its nature, has no real effect. No reason is given
as to whether an "open loop" rule should be preferred to a "feed 
2 )back" rule. This result should generate consensus within the 
profession since the supporters of the neoclassical synthesis 
(e.g. Modigliani, 1977; Tobin, 1980) can be interpreted as advocating 
the adoption of a systematic rule of aggregate demand regulation.
Nevertheless it is true that there is a general sense in which 
the ineffectiveness proposition is well founded. In this case I 
prefer to rechristen it the "uselessness of economic policy axiom".
If an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is the certainty equivalent of a com­
petitive equilibrium with rational expectations any economic policy 
without distribution effects will be much more than ineffective, it 
will be useless. It would be particiilarly difficult to discover 
the need for it. It is hardly a new proposition in economic theory 
that there is no trade off between inflation and employment at full 
employment. 1
1) In fairness it should be recognised that these limitations 
have been generally admitted by the supporters of the new 
classical school, but in a manner and context whose purpose is
to prove the superiority of their approach and the "fatal defects" 
of alternative approaches (e.g. Lucas and Sargent, 1979; Barro 
1981; McCallum, 1979).
2) Lucas' pleas for the Friedmanite programme (1980b) are difficult to 
understand. It is true that his model (1972b) leads to a 
preference for a systematic rather than an arbitrary rule and 
that the latter has effects only because of expectation errors 
which it provokes. But even from this viewpoint the result is 
not robust. Azariadis (1981) has shown within the framework
of Lucas' model, that from the viewpoint of economic welfare 





























































































This axiom does not derive from the rational expectations 
assumption alone, but from its incorporation into a competitive 
temporary equilibrium model. It has already been seen that if 
the equilibrium is not unique, the rationality of expectations would 
not necessarily contradict the effects of monetary policy. A fortiori 
this is true if the framework of the Walrasian model is abandoned for 
the more general non-walrasian models previously analysed. There, 
monetary policy will be especially more effective if it is rationally 
expected since it will modify the quantity constraints confronting
4- 1)economic agents.
More generally the rationality of expectations is a useful working 
hypothesis and one of the merits of the new classical school is the 
stress on its consequences in the important field of economic policy 
evaluation. The argument is extremely simple (Lucas, 1972a, 1976; 
Lucas and Sargent, 1979). The simulation of the effects of different 
economic policy measures implies the identification of the structural 
form of econometric models. This identification implies a series of 
assumptions and a priori restrictions; restrictions as to the 
matrices of endogenous and exogenous variables; as to the matrix of 
random errors; the a priori classification of variables between exo­
genous and endogenous, etc. The identification problem is precisely 
that of never being sure of having correctly detected the structural 
form of the model. In particular macroeconometric "keynesian" models 
use a priori restrictions which are not generally consistent with 
the rational expectations assumption. If agents' forecasts are 
calculated starting from the whole model and all of present and 
past data, restrictions concerning the matrix of errors will be 
generally contradicted, in the same way as is the classification of 
variables into two categories (Lucas and Sargent, 1979). For in 
the majority of "keynesian" models the expected value of a variable 
depends only on past values of the same variable. The difficulty 
comes from structural parameters so identified not being invariant 
to those actions of economic policy whose effects are to be measured. 1
1) A series of works are devoted to this question: Fisher (1977;




























































































If the estimate of these parameters depends on the economic policy
rule previously chosen the evaluation of other economic policies
will be generally mistaken. The right strategy should be to make
economic policy explicit through a relation in the model and to
establish a series of cross-equations restrictions, since a
modification of economic policy rules will have a feedback on the
parameters of other equations of the model. This critique, therefore,
does not lead to a general condemnation of econometric models but
to proposing statistical, econometric and theoretical strategies1)able to resolve the problem of economic policy evaluation.
This criticism is regarded as fatal for keynesian economics 
however. It is in the nature of the General Theory that it leads 
to a priori restrictions starting from arbitrary rules of thumb 
instead of considering the intertemporal optimisation problem of 
economic agents as a whole. This leads to an arbitrary distribution 
of zeros in the Jacobian of the model. For example, this is the 
case with the consumption function or with the liquidity preference 
function. The structural form of a keynesian model will never be 
capable of being identified (Lucas and Sargent, 1979) therefore.
What was only a specific and well founded critique of the current 
use of large scale econometric models in the majority of Western 
countries becomes the death certificate of a theoretical approach.
And, as always, the excessiveness of a critique draws attention to 
its own weakness. At first it goes without saying that the generation 
of non-walrasian models is also based on problems of intertemporal 
optimisation. There is no reason why the "right" estimation strategy 
should not be applied to these models and that a feedback rule 
describing the behaviour of public bodies should not be explicitly 
introduced among the equations. Then the rational expectation as­
sumption cannot be tested independently of the theoretical structure 
in which it is embedded (Schiller, 1978). By itself 1
1) The use of econometric models for short term unconditional fore­
casts is not requeried by this reasoning since the problem of 
forecasting must be distinguished from that of simulation. In 
the case of simulation an external perturbation, i.e. the modifi­
cation of statistical series representing one or many exogenous 
variables, implies a new series of decisions and the decision 





























































































this property establishes no hierarchy of alternative approaches. 
Finally, and above all, the general affirmation that it is impossible 
to discover the "true" structural form should not only be applied to 
a particular class of models. The identification problem can only be 
solved relatively. The reality approximated by our estimation methods 
is always of a greater dimension than that of the models which we 
use. Any system of a lower dimension than that of the phenomenon 
it tries to represent is always vulnerable from the identification 
problem viewpoint. This is particularly true of a macroeconomic 
model which restricts the space of phenomena to a very reduced 
dimension. (And macroeconometric models built by the new classical 
school are generally much smaller than the traditional keynesian 
model1 .̂) But this is also true of any economic model.
The very concise and partial account of the "rational expecta­
tions revolution" (Begg, 1982) given here, can be seen as overcritical 
but the reader can also interpret it as underlining certain problems 
which deserve to figure in the research agenda of the new classical 
school. The equilibrium assumption, even when formalised within 
a dynamic model, does not yet seem to be able to produce a convincing 
explanation of macroeconomic fluctuations.
CONCLUSION
Of the two possible interpretations of the General Theory "modern 
macroeconomic theory" has essentially retained that which has a 
familiar look. This has led to a walrasian reading of macroeconomics. 
The theories presented here all have a common filiation and the 
same limits as the original model: the coherence of the system as 
a whole is presupposed instead of being explained. The auctioneer 
is still alive and well, the theory of price determination is evane­
scent, and the theory of quantity allocation is exogenous to the 
model. But perhaps it is not fair to quarrel with this. Since the 
study of equilibrium is given a special status, the reasoning is 1




























































































cast within the framework of perfectly co-ordinated systems. And 
one of the major contributions of recent developments is to have 
shown that within such a framework rationality does not necessarily 
lead to full employment equilibrium or to the stationarity of that 
equilibrium. Another positive aspect of recent research is that it 
is expressed in a common language thus allowing a dialogue and 
a cross fertilisation of different approaches.
But at the same time this establishes the partial characters of 
the new developments. The theoretical structure chosen singularly 
limits the range of relevant questions, i.e. the domain of macro­
economics. Perhaps the problem is not uniquely that of knowing 
whether keynesian results can be deduced from a microeconomic ana­
lysis of general equilibrium or whether walrasian conclusions can 
be obtained starting from the ISLM model. It would still be neces­
sary to build theoretical structures able to generate new questions 
and/or pose other questions to existing structures. If a macro­
system as a whole has coherence perhaps it would be useful to study 
directly the reasons which determine its coherence. This probably 
is the course underlined by Keynes when he stressed his intention 
of studying "the system as a whole". If a macroeconomic logic 
partially independent of that which determines individual beha­
viour exists - an underemployment equilibrium is surely an equili­
brium relatively to the system and not to the individuals composing 
it - perhaps that logic deserves to be analysed in itself. That 
it has only rarely been analysed does not represent an impossibility 
theorem. My conviction is that macroeconomics has its own dimension 
which must be considered and not just alluded to. J.R. Oppenheimer 
wrote: "common sense is only wrong if it requires that what is fami­
liar to us should necessarily reappear in what is not and if it 
leads us to hope that every country visited should resemble the 
previous one". Whether it has been wrong to visit the General Theory 
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